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#2A-10/12/88 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
NEW ROCHELLE HOUSING-AUTHORITY— 
WESTCHESTER 860, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10001 
NEW ROCHELLE HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE, ESQ. (JEROME LEFKOWITZ, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, New Rochelle Housing Authority - Westchester 860 (CSEA) 
to the dismissal by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director), as deficient, of 
its improper practice charge against the New Rochelle Housing 
Authority (Authority), which alleges a violation of §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees• Fair Employment Act (Act). 
In particular, CSEA's charge alleges that on January 1, 
1988, three bargaining unit members employed as maintenance 
workers were terminated in contemplation of the sale of the 
j Authority building in which they worked. Although the 
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planned sale failed to occur, the laid off workers were not 
rehired, but the work was redistributed to the remaining 
maintenance employees, who are required to do the work of the 
terminated employees in addition to their other duties. CSEA 
asserts that the layoff of employees without a curtailment of 
services and, accordingly, with a concomitant increase in 
workload for the remaining employees, constitutes a mandatory 
subject of bargaining, and that the Authority's actions, 
taken without negotiation with CSEA, constitute a violation 
of the Act. 
The Director dismissed the charge for failure to set 
forth a claim which if proven would constitute a violation of 
^ the Act upon the ground that an employer is not obligated 
under the Act to negotiate with an employee organization 
concerning the number of employees it deems necessary or 
appropriate to deliver its services. The Director further 
found that, to the extent that the Authority•s reduction in 
its work force had an impact upon terms and conditions of 
employment of remaining bargaining unit employees, it was 
obligated to negotiate the impact only, and then only upon 
demand.-i/ 
In its exceptions, CSEA argues that the elimination of 
bargaining unit jobs is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining 
1/There is no claim in the instant charge of refusal, on 
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only when a simultaneous curtailment of services or abolition 
of functions takes place. In support of this proposition, it 
cites the following language from this Board's decision in 
City School District of the City of New Rochellef 4 PERB 
53060, at p. 3706 (1971). 
Decisions of a public employer with 
respect to the carrying out of its 
mission, such as a decision to eliminate 
or curtail a service, are matters that a 
public employer should not be compelled 
to negotiate with its employees [footnote 
omitted]. 
However, we stated our conclusion in that case in the 
following manner: 
[T]he decision of the School 
Superintendent involving budgetary cuts 
with concomitant job elimination is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiations between 
the [union] and the employer. We 
conclude further, however, that the 
employer is obligated to negotiate with 
the [union] on the impact of such 
decisions on the terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees affected 
[footnote omitted] (at p. 3707). 
Notwithstanding CSEA's contention that our holdings in 
New Rochelle make layoffs a nonmandatory subject of 
bargaining only if accompanied by a curtailment of service, 
we read our decision more broadly to hold generally that the 
decision to lay off employees is not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. 
2/ 
It is our conclusion that the Authority's decision to 
27See General Brown Teachers Association, 10 PERB f3041 (1977). 
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reduce its work force by laying off employees, even when no 
curtailment of service takes place, is not itself a mandatory 
subject of bargaining.-2/ Even though such a decision 
obviously affects the terms and conditions of employment of 
the laid off employees, the decision itself to lay off 
employees and cut expenditures accordingly is a management 
prerogative. As stated by the Director, and as we held in 
New Rochelle, supra, the impact of the decision to lay off 
employees is subject to bargaining on demand. 
Notwithstanding our holding that the decision to lay off 
employees, even without a curtailment of service, is a 
management prerogative over which an employer does not have a 
statutory duty to bargain, CSEA raises before us the 
interesting question of whether the burden of the concomitant 
increase in workload on the remaining employees is in any 
respect a mandatory subject of bargaining. In this regard, 
the term "workload" is subject to at least two different 
meanings. If the term is interpreted as meaning, in the 
context of this case, an increase in the number of buildings 
to be cleaned and maintained, without more, an increase in 
"workload" may not affect terms and conditions of employment, 
because the additional work may be distributed over a longer 
time frame, with no change in the amount or scope of work 
required on a day-to-day basis. However, if increase in 
^/See Oswego CSD, 5 PERB 13011 (1972). 
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workload means that bargaining unit members are required to 
accomplish significantly more work in the course of a 
workday, a change in terms and conditions of employment may 
have taken place, and the balancing test between employer 
mission and employee interest in terms and conditions of 
employment enunciated by this Board in a number of cases 
might apply.4/ 
We are unable to ascertain the meaning attributed to the 
term "workload" as it is used in CSEA's charge, although the 
clarification statements made by CSEA, on request of the 
Director's designee, may reasonably be construed to mean that 
the term "workload" as used in the charge is defined as an 
increase in the amount of work required of bargaining unit 
members on a day-to-day basis. In any event, in view of the 
ambiguity in the terminology used, we deem it appropriate to 
remand the matter to the Director for further proceedings, 
including further clarification, submission of an answer 
and/or hearing to determine whether the Authority's reduction 
in force primarily affected terms and conditions of 
employment. 
5 / 
4 /s_ee , a s one example . S t a t e of New York. 18 PERB 5[3064 (1985) . 
V s e e , N o r t h p o r t UFSD. 9 PERB H3003 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . 
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IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, remanded to the Director for further proceedings 
not inconsistent herewith. 
DATED: October 12, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
LUMK- Y. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mem6er 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VERNETTA R. GARVIN, 
Charging Party, 
-and— CASE NO. -U-92 40 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC., 
Respondent. 
SHELLMAN D. JOHNSON, for Charging Party 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Vernetta R. Garvin (Garvin), charging party, excepts to the 
dismissal of an improper practice charge alleging, as amended, 
that the United University Professions, Inc. (UUP) breached its 
duty of fair representation under the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it failed to process to arbitration a 
grievance against her employer, the State University of New York 
(SUNY). The Administrative Law Judge (ALT) assigned to the case 
dismissed the charge, on motion of UUP, at the conclusion of 
Garvin's direct case, upon the ground of failure to present a 
prima facie case. 
UUP cross-excepts to the refusal of the ALJ to dismiss the 
charge upon two threshold grounds: first, the charge was 
improperly amended to change the subsection of the Act alleged to 
have been violated because it was purportedly amended by Garvin's 
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representative in an unverified letter, in violation of 
§204.1(a)(3) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), and second, 
the original charge, which alleged a violation of §209-a.2(b) of 
the Act, required dismissal upon the ground that Garvin lacks 
standingto—make such—a charge^ 
The ALJ found that, while UUP correctly asserted that an 
individual, as compared to an employee organization, is without 
standing to allege a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Act, Garvin, 
by her representative, adequately amended the charge to allege a 
violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act on the premise that it is 
within the discretion of an ALJ to accept an amendment which 
conforms the subsection of law alleged to have been violated to 
the facts alleged in the charge.i/ In so finding, the ALJ 
identified the requirement contained in our Rules for 
verification of a charge as applying particularly to verification 
of the facts alleged in support of the charge, rather than to the 
legal conclusion to be drawn concerning what subsection(s) of the 
Act may have been violated. In reaching her finding, the ALJ 
took into account that the charge was litigated by the parties as 
a §209-a.2(a) charge and that no prejudice, or even claim 
thereof, resulted from amendment of the charge. In support of 
her rulings, the ALJ cited our decisions in County of Nassau 
- -i/section 204.1(d) of the Rules permits the amendment of 
) a charge "upon such terms as may be deemed just and 
consistent with due process." 
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(Sinicropi), 17 PERB 13119 (1984), and UUP (Barrv), 19 PERB ^3082 
(1986). 
We concur with and affirm the AKT's finding that the charge 
is properly construed as an alleged violation of §209-a.2(a) of 
the Act and that the amendment of the charge- to correct the 
section of law alleged to have been violated to accord with the 
allegations contained in the charge is contemplated by our Rules 
of Procedure and does not violate our Rule requiring verification 
of a charge. UUP's motion to dismiss upon these grounds was, 
accordingly, properly denied. 
We now turn to the exceptions of the charging party to the 
) dismissal of the charge by the ALT at the conclusion of the 
charging party's case upon the ground of failure to present a 
prima facie case of breach of the duty of fair representation 
pursuant to §209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
At the hearing in this matter, Garvin testified on her own 
behalf and introduced three documents into evidence. These 
documents consisted of a June 15, 1984 letter of resignation 
prepared by Garvin's supervisor, which he requested, and which 
she refused to sign; a copy of a grievance signed by Garvin 
against her employer; and an October 17, 1986 letter from Garvin 
to Dr. Nuala Drescher, President of UUP, in response to UUP's 
determination that Garvin's grievance would not proceed to 
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at-issue grievance was allegedly based was not offered or 
received in evidence.-2/ 
One of Garvin's exceptions asserts that the ALJ improperly 
failed to rule on the question of whether UUP * s failure to 
process Garvin's grievance was-raeially motivated and -was the 
result of racial discrimination. Contrary to Garvin's-claim, we 
note that the ALJ, at page 8 of her decision, did address the 
issue of race discrimination, finding that there is "no" factual 
support in the record for Garvin's accusation that SUNY, OER and 
UUP acted against her because of race, even assuming that such 
might be a violation of the Taylor Law [footnote omitted]." Our 
review of the record supports the ALJ finding, and Garvin cites 
no evidence in the record which would contradict the finding or 
would support in any respect a race discrimination claim 
necessary to establish a duty of fair representation breach 
finding, as required by our Rules [Rules §§204.10(b)(3) and (4)]. 
•^/on appeal to this Board, Garvin sought to introduce a copy of 
the collective bargaining agreement between UUP and her employer. 
Garvin was informed, by letter, and it is here confirmed, that 
this Board will consider only the evidence accepted and made a 
part of the record before the ALJ, unless one of the exceptions 
before us is an alleged erroneous refusal by the ALJ to accept 
proffered material into evidence or unless some other 
extraordinary circumstance, such as newly discovered evidence, 
exists. Since no request was made of the ALJ at the hearing in 
this matter to receive a copy of the collective bargaining 
agreement, or relevant portions thereof, in evidence, such 
material is not properly before us at this time, and may not be 
considered. This ruling also applies to a motion made by Garvin 
to introduce to the Board a 1985 performance evaluation not 
offered to the ALJ. That motion is accordingly denied. 
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The remaining exceptions to the ALT decision relate to the 
ALJ's finding that a prima facie case of breach of the duty of 
fair representation had not been presented during the charging 
party's direct case. Garvin established that she had filed a 
grievance on or about October 1, 1985," that the grievance 
proceeded through the first three steps of the UUP-State of New 
York grievance procedure, and that, prior to the arbitration 
step, UUP informed her that a determination had been made that 
"there is no sound contractual basis which would justify taking 
[the grievance] to step 4 (arbitration) of the union's grievance 
procedure." Garvin presented no evidence that the claimed basis 
) for denial of arbitration by UUP was pretextual or that the 
decision not to arbitrate her grievance was made in bad faith or 
for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons, as she was required to 
do to support her claim. 
1/ 
Garvin failed to establish by any probative evidence that 
her grievance set forth allegations which would constitute a 
violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the 
State of New York and UUP, and she further failed to establish 
that the UUP abused its discretion in any fashion in refusing to 
proceed to arbitration on her behalf. Garvin relies on her 
October 17, 1986 letter of response to UUP President Drescher as 
3/Brighton Transportation Association, 10 PERB f3090 (1977); CSEA 
j XKandell, 13 PERB 53049 (1980); Local 32, Long Island Public 
Service Employees (MacLeon) , 20 PERB [^3045 (1987) (appeal pending) . 
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her basis for claiming that the refusal to proceed to arbitration 
was an arbitrary or capricious decision or one made in bad faith. 
However, that document, while containing argument in support of 
Garvin's desire to proceed to arbitration, does not constitute 
evidence that—h-e-r- grievance had merit or that UUP—acted-in an 
arbitrary or capricious fashion in refusing to proceed further. 
In the absence of any probative evidence supporting a claim 
of breach of duty of fair representation, the burden of proof did 
not shift to the UUP and the ALJ properly dismissed the charge at 
the conclusion of the direct case. 
4/ 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: October 12, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member I 
4/s_ee County of Nassau (Police Department) , 17 PERB 13 013 (1984) . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NOT U-92 68 
-and-
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE, ESQ. (JOSEPH E. O'DONNELL, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE, DE ANGELIS & EISMAN, ESQS. (PETER A. BEE, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (CSEA) to the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing its improper practice charge against the 
County of Nassau (County). CSEA alleged in its charge that 
the County violated §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act (Act) by terminating a unit 
employee, Freeman, in retaliation for his filing of two 
grievances which were sustained at arbitration. 
Freeman was employed by the County as a nurse's aide for 
15 years and had regularly worked the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. 
shift. On May 29, 1985, Freeman allegedly abused an elderly 
11762 
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patient. The next day, the County discharged Freeman. 
Within a week, CSEA filed a grievance on Freeman's behalf, 
which grievance was sustained on October 16, 1985. The 
arbitrator found that the County had failed to prove patient 
abuse and~directed Freeman's reinstatement.—The County 
thereupon reinstated Freeman to his former 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 
p.m. shift. 
On April 4, 1986, the County received notification that, 
on April 1, 1986, Freeman had been convicted after trial of 
harassment based upon a complaint arising from the incident 
which occurred on May 29, 1985. On April 21, 1986, Freeman 
i received notice of reassignment to the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. 
shift at the laundry effective May 6, 1986. Upon receipt of 
such notification, Freeman told his supervisor that he could 
not work the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift because he had to 
take care of his children during the daytime. He was told to 
report to the shift or stay home. Freeman failed to report 
on May 6, 1986, and, on June 16, 1986, the County terminated 
Freeman. CSEA filed a grievance on his behalf. 
On January 23, 1987, the arbitrator ordered Freeman 
reinstated, finding that the verbal instruction to report was 
ambiguous. The County, on January 30, 1987, notified Freeman 
to report to work on the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift at the 
laundry. Freeman never reported for such work and, on 
J February 17, 1987, the County discharged him. 
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In her decision, the ALJ observed that in order to 
sustain its charge, CSEA had the burden of proving, among 
other things, that the County would not have taken the action 
it did but for Freeman's exercise of protected rights. The 
AEJ found that the_County credibly showed ^ that the 
reassignment of Freeman was prompted solely by Freeman's 
criminal conviction and that the assignments to the day shift 
in both April, 1986 and January, 1987 were based on the 
County's concern that Freeman be assigned to a shift that 
would remove him from patient care and would allow the County 
to exercise a greater degree of supervision over him. 
) In its exceptions, CSEA argues that the reasons given by 
the County may have justified transfer to the laundry but not 
the change of shift. CSEA urges that the County, having been 
made aware of Freeman's inability to work the day shift 
because of his family situation, could have removed him from 
a patient care role, but still accommodated his continuing on 
the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift. Thus, CSEA contends, it 
was error for the ALT to find that the County was motivated 
by legitimate business reasons. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the ALJ's finding that the assignments to the 
day shift in both April, 1986 and January, 1987 were a proper 
exercise of management authority. 
; 
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CSEA asks us to infer that the County acted in 
retaliation for Freeman's successful exercise of his 
grievance rights. The evidence does not permit us to draw 
such a conclusion. The County took no action against Freeman 
after the ^first arbitration award. Only after the County had 
been notified of his criminal conviction did the County act 
to change his assignment and shift in April, 1986. The 
credible testimony of the County's witness establishes that 
the County was motivated to take such action at that time 
solely by a desire to remove him from direct patient care and 
bring him under the greater supervision available on a day 
; shift when more supervisors work. Furthermore, the record is 
clear that the County was not aware of Freeman's family 
situation when it first directed the change of assignment. 
Freeman's subsequent refusal to work the day shift was, of 
course, the subject of the second arbitration award. After 
the arbitrator sustained Freeman's grievance because the 
County's order to report was ambiguous, the County reiterated 
its reassignment of Freeman in January, 1987. 
The record does not support a finding that the County 
had a different motivation in January, 1987 than it had in 
April, 1986. We agree with the ALJ's conclusion that the 
County was still motivated by the same concerns that prompted 
the original decision to reassign Freeman. There is nothing 
) • in this record that could support a finding that the County 
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could reasonably have taken other steps to accommodate 
Freeman's family situation while, at the same time, assuring 
his removal from patient care and allowing greater 
supervision over him. We must conclude, therefore, that the 
County's assignment was not improperly motivated and that 
Freeman's termination was the result of his own unwillingness 
or inability to comply with the County's order, and that such 
termination was not in violation of §§209-a.l(a) and/or (c) 
of the Act. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge be, and hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: October 12, 1988 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU Case No. S-0002 
for a determination pursuant to 
Section 212 of the Civil Service 
Law. — —- -- - — 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Pursuant to §212 of the Civil Service Law, the County of 
Nassau has submitted an application by which it seeks a 
determination that its Ordinance No. 549-1981, as amended on 
June 20, 1988 by Ordinance No. 292-1988, is substantially 
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in 
Article 14 of the Civil Service Law with respect to the 
State. Specifically, the amendment brings the County of 
Nassau's ordinance into conformity with Chapter 204 of the 
Laws of 1987, which extended the Taylor Law's interest 
arbitration provisions for an additional two years. 
Having reviewed the application and having determined 
that the subject ordinance, as amended, is substantially 
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in 
Article 14 of the Civil Service Law with respect to the 
State, 
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IT IS ORDERED that the application of the County of 
Nassau be, and it hereby is, approved. 
DATED: October 12, 1988 
Albany, New York 
^ X ^ g iVCr-
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
//2E-10/12/88 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer/Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2827 
SECURITY UNIT EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
RICHARD J. DAUTNER, ESQ., for Employer/Petitioner 
ROWLEY, FORREST and O'DONNELL, P.C., for 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The State of New York (State) excepts to so much of a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) as dismissed its petition to remove 
the titles of Correction Sergeant, Supervising Environmental 
Conservation Officer, Environmental Investigator II and 
Forest Ranger II from the Security Services Unit represented 
by Security Unit Employees, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Council 82) and to place them in the Security Supervisors 
Unit.-3=/ In particular, the State alleges that the Director 
failed to accord proper weight to the supervisory 
•3=/The petition sought 21 titles, but agreement was 
reached on 17 of them, 5 of which were removed. No appeal 
was taken from the Director's decision placing these 5 titles 
in the Security Supervisors Unit. 
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responsibilities of the individuals holding the at-issue 
titles and failed to accord appropriate weight to the State's 
evidence concerning the adverse effect of retaining sergeants 
in the Security Services Unit. The State also asserts that 
the—Director erred in failing to find that Local 1873 of 
Council 8 22/ engaged in actual subversion of the functions of 
supervisors in the bargaining unit, claiming that such 
subversion constitutes an adequate basis for removing 
supervisory positions from the Security Services Unit, citing 
our decisions in East Greenbush CSD, 17 PERB 53083 (1984), 
City of White Plains, 16 PERB 53096 (1983), and other cases. 
After carefully reviewing the record and written 
submissions of the parties, and after hearing oral argument 
in this matter, it is our determination that the decision of 
the Director should be affirmed. In so finding, we note our 
well established policy that a bargaining unit of long 
standing-3-/ will not be disturbed in the absence of compelling 
evidence that the existing bargaining unit does not meet or 
no longer meets the statutory standards which applied or 
should have applied to the creation of the unit at its 
^/Local 1873 represents Environmental Conservation 
Officers (ECO's), Supervising ECO's, Environmental 
Investigators and Forest Rangers in the New York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation. 
3-/see State of New York, 2 PERB 53037 (1969). 
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outset. Those standards are set forth in §207.1 of the 
Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act), which directs 
this Board to 
define the appropriate employer-employee 
negotiating units taking into account the 
following standards:—(a) the definition 
of the unit shall correspond to a 
community of interest among the employees 
to be included in the unit; (b) the 
officials of government at the level of 
the unit shall have the power to agree, 
or to make effective recommendations to 
other administrative authority or the 
legislative body with respect to the 
terms and conditions of employment upon 
which the employees desire to negotiate; 
and (c) the unit shall be compatible with 
the joint responsibilities of the public 
employer and public employees to serve 
the public. 
In applying these standards, the Board has consistently 
held that a considerable burden rests upon a party seeking to 
change a unit previously held to be appropriate. We have 
held that several factors are relevant to the determination 
of whether fragmentation of supervisory employees from a unit 
which includes rank-and-file members, including the 
following: evidence of actual subversion of effective 
supervision (County of Ulster. 16 PERB f3069 (1983)), "the 
level of supervisory functions of the employees involved, the 
nature and size of the existing and proposed units, the 
nature of the service performed by the employees involved and 
I ^/see, e.g. , County of Rensselaer (HVCC) , 18 PERB U[3 001 
(1985); City of Schenectady. 19 PERB f3027 (1986). 
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any special working relationship between them." (County of 
Ulster, supra, at p.3111). 
In a situation where, as here, both the rank-and-file and 
the supervisors units are long established, we must decide more 
than- whether the supervisors here at issue are "more like" or 
"share a greater community of interest with" their subordinates 
or with their own supervisors, who are in the Security 
Supervisors Unit. We must further decide whether their current 
unit placement is compatible with the public interest, and 
whether experience has established the existence of a conflict of 
interest within that unit which interferes with the public 
) interest. We will discuss consider these issues with respect to 
Correction Sergeants and the Department of Environmental 
Conservation titles separately. 
Correction Sergeants 
The Director found, and we agree, that the community of 
interest shared by the Correction Officers and Sergeants is 
at least as great, if not greater than, the community of 
interest shared by the Sergeants, Lieutenants and other 
supervisory titles. In so finding, of particular 
significance is the evidence concerning the similarity in 
working conditions of the Correction Officers and Sergeants 
(working almost exclusively "in population", with its 
attendant specialized risks and responsibilities, and the 
) similarity of duties [supervisory responsibilities comprise 
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only a portion of the duties expected of Sergeants, who 
otherwise perform duties substantially similar to those of 
Correction Officers]). 
We also agree with the Director that the State has not 
established actual subversion of supervisory functions with 
respect to the Correction Sergeant title. We adopt the 
findings of the Director in this regard. 
We further find, as did the Director, that the 
supervisory duties performed by Correction Sergeants are not 
of a sufficiently high level to warrant a finding that those 
duties create an inherent conflict of interest between them 
) and those whom they supervise. In so finding, we note that 
the supervisory responsibilities of Correction Sergeants are 
strictly circumscribed with respect to work assignments and 
working conditions. Correction Sergeants play no role in the 
hiring process or assignment of Correction Officers to 
facilities, and evaluations and counseling performed by 
Sergeants, as well as misconduct reports, are in the nature 
of recommendations only, and do not have effect until they 
have been approved by Lieutenants. Sergeants do not play any 
role in the formal grievance procedure contained in the 
Council 82-State collective bargaining agreement. Based upon 
the foregoing, it cannot be said that those supervisory 
duties performed by Sergeants create an inherent conflict of 
; 
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interest between them and the other employees in the 
bargaining unit. 
Department of Environmental Conservation Titles 
In his decision the Director detailed his reasoning, and 
the evidence in support thereof, for the determination that 
the supervisory duties of persons holding the titles of 
Supervising Environmental Conservation Officer, Environmental 
Conservation Investigator II and Forest Ranger II are not of 
such a high level as to require their removal from the 
Security Services Unit and their placement in the Security 
Supervisors Unit. The Director's findings appear in his 
decision at 21 PERB ^4024 (1988), and will not be repeated 
here. We also affirm the Director's decision insofar as it 
finds that the State failed to meet its burden of proving 
that retention of persons in these titles in the Security 
Services Unit would or does have an adverse effect upon the 
fulfillment of its responsibilities as a public employer or 
the employees' fulfillment of their responsibilities as 
public employees, in their service to the public. 
Finally, we concur with the Director in his finding that 
the evidence adduced by the State in support of the 
proposition that active subversion of effective supervision 
has taken place by virtue of the publication of two Council 82 
publications pertaining to the at-issue supervisory titles, is 
factually insufficient to establish that Council 82 has engaged 
11774 
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in an attempt to subvert the supervisory individuals in 
carrying out their functions. See City of White Plains, 16 
PERB 1[3096 (1983) . 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT the 
deeisionof-the Director is affirmed, and it is further 
ordered that the petition be, and it hereby is, dismissed 
insofar as it seeks to remove the aforementioned four titles 
from the Security Services Unit and place them in the 
Security Supervisors Unit. 
DATED: October 12, 1988 
Albany, New York 
'AA-^MA^^^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 




STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION, LOCAL 693, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
VILLAGE OF WALTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local Union, Local 
693, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Motor Equipment Operator, Operator Trainee, 
Senior Operator, Heavy Equipment Operator, 
Mechanic, Recreation Leader, and Police Clerk. 
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Excluded: Public Works Superintendent, Assistant Public 
Works Superintendent, Chief Operator and all 
other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local Union, 
Local 693, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 12, 1988 
Albany, New York 
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VESTAL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested.in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Substitutes United In 
Broome, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers who have 
received a reasonable assurance of continuing 
employment as referenced in Civil Service Law 
§201.7(d) . 
Excluded: All other employees. 
CASE NO. C - 3 3 8 1 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Substitutes United in 
Broome, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: October 12, 1988 
Albany, New York 
) 
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